Carnivore conservation is considered essential because the species offer significant benefits to biodiversity. However, their predation on ungulates reduces ungulate populations with subsequent effects on hunters' harvests and welfare. In this paper, we use the hedonic price method to estimate the effects of large carnivores on hunting lease prices. We disentangle the impact of carnivores through their effect on game harvest from their effect on hunters' preferences. Results reveal that lynx impose a significant economic cost to owners of hunting rights due to the predation of game. On average, the implicit cost of an additional lynx family is SEK 1.51 million (EUR 0.162 million) per year, and with 95% certainty, the cost per lynx family is at least SEK 340 thousand (EUR 36.6 thousand) per year. servation programs (Zeiler et al.
Introduction
Contemporary conservation of large carnivores is a success story in many parts of Europe (Chapron et al., 2014; Linnell et al., 2001) but also a source of intense debate around the world (Gangaas et al., 2013; Lüchtrath and Schraml, 2015) . While proponents of conservation argue that these species play a critical ecological role as top predators, many farmers, hunters, landowners, and rural residents claim that the impact on their livelihoods due to predation of game and livestock is too large (Ramler et al., 2014; Robbins, 2006; Steele et al., 2013) . Several studies have attempted to quantify the economic losses incurred by livestock owners and confirmed that carnivore depredation results in significant costs (Asheim and Mysterud, 2004; Bostedt and Grahn, 2008; Widman and Elofsson, 2018) . Moreover, the optimal design of policy instruments to mitigate effects of depredation on livestock has gained considerable attention in the literature (Rondeau and Bulte, 2007; Engel et al., 2008; Zabel et al., 2011; Zabel et al., 2014; Skonhoft, 2016) . In practical policy, multiple instruments have been implemented to sustain conservation policies, increase the acceptance of carnivore populations, and reduce the costs to farmers including, for example, carnivore zones, subsidies for on-farm prevention measures, and compensation to farmers for livestock predation (Treves and Karanth, 2003) .
By contrast, the impact of carnivores on the hunting values that accrue to hunters and landowners has achieved little attention in the literature and in practical policy. However, increasing populations of large carnivores reduces the prey population growth rate, reducing the potential harvest for hunters (Eberhardt et al., 2003; Wikenros et al., 2015) . Sometimes, large carnivores injure or kill hunting dogs, a source of distress for hunters (Backeryd, 2007; Kojola and Kuittinen, 2002) . Hunters argue that the reduction in hunting value is substantial, and claims for compensation have been raised. For example, the Swedish Hunters Association estimates that the reduction in hunting value due to carnivores is approximately 50 million EUR per year, almost eight times larger than the wildlife damage compensation paid to livestock owners (Svensk Jakt, 2009 ). Compensation to hunters was demanded when the wolf population target in Västmanland county was reinterpreted as implying a minimum number rather than a target number, and the reinterpretation resulted in the cancellation of license hunting (Vargfakta, 2011) . There were also demands for compensation when a genetically important wolf was moved from the reindeer herding areas in northern Sweden, where wolves are not permitted, to Örebro county in mid Sweden (Lövbom, 2013) . Difficulties in determining the impact of carnivores on the value of game harvest and hunting lease prices are a possible reason for the absence of research and policy in this area. In the absence of policies to sustain conservation directed to hunters and landowners, carnivores are often poached by hunters who oppose carnivore conservation (Gangaas et al., 2013) , negatively influencing carnivore populations (Andrén et al., 2006; Persson et al., 2009 ).
In the search for efficient management strategies to resolve hunter-carnivore conflicts, a sufficient understanding of the impact of carnivore presence and predation on values generated by hunting is crucial. Several studies have attempted to offer an exposition on the underlying reasons behind hunters' attitudes toward carnivore con- Røskaft et al., 2007; Heberlein and Ericsson, 2008; Wikenros et al., 2015) . Wikenros et al. (2015) , for instance, estimate the effect of wolf predation on hunters' harvest of moose in Sweden by comparing harvest levels inside versus outside of wolf territories. Their results indicate a significant decline in moose harvest in wolf territories compared with areas without wolves. Social factors such as knowledge and experience with encounters with carnivores have also been identified as factors that influence attitudes toward conservation programs (Ericsson and Heberlein, 2003; Kellert, 1990) , and individuals living in wolf areas are less benign to wolves (Ericsson and Heberlein, 2003) . However, the economic impact of carnivores on hunting is, according to our review of the literature, an overlooked research area because identification of the effects on the economic value of hunting is a critical step toward understanding the overall effects of carnivores on hunters' and landowners' welfare.
The aim of this paper is to estimate the effect of the presence of large carnivores on hunting lease prices and, hence, to identify the associated cost of carnivores to hunters and landowners in Sweden. To achieve this goal, the following empirical strategy is used. First, we combine data on hunting lease prices and bag rates obtained from a survey of Swedish hunters with data on the population distribution of two large carnivores: Eurasian lynx (Lynx lynx) and wolf (Canis lupus). This information is used to estimate a hedonic price model where we disentangle the total effect of carnivores into: (1) the direct effect on hunting lease prices due to the impact of carnivores on hunters' perceived recreational value of spending time on the hunting ground and perceived risk of an attack on hunting dogs, and (2) the indirect effects on hunting lease price due to the carnivores' impact on harvest rates. These effects are estimated using the three-stage least squares (3SLS) method. Using estimates from the hedonic price model, we compute the implicit values associated with carnivore presence on the hunting lease prices. The resulting implicit values can be interpreted as the amount of compensation that the hunting right owner would be willing to accept in exchange for an increase in the carnivore populations.
Our results reveal a significant and negative effect of lynx population abundance on game harvest, particularly roe and fallow deer, but no direct effect of lynx on hunting lease prices. For wolves, by contrast, we find indications of a direct negative effect on lease prices but no indirect effect through the impact on harvest. The results reveal significant costs of carnivores to hunters: on average, one more lynx territory in one municipality would reduce hunting lease prices in that municipality by 15.7%, corresponding to a total economic cost for landowners in the municipality equal to SEK 1.51 million (EUR 0.162 million) per year.
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we present a brief overview of carnivore conservation policies, management strategies, and attitudes toward carnivore populations in Sweden; and section 3 presents the conceptual model. Section 4 offers a description of the methodology and data. In section 5, we present and discuss the findings of the paper. Conclusions and implications for policy are discussed in section 6.
Carnivores, their wild prey, and the market for hunting leases in Sweden
The aim of current carnivore management in Sweden is that all large carnivore populations should attain favorable conservation status (Trouwborst et al., 2017) while not substantially hindering livestock farming and in consideration of socioeconomic effects (SEPA, 2014a (SEPA, , 2014b (SEPA, , 2014c . Much of the challenge for the management of expanding carnivore populations in Sweden is related to predation on livestock and game, and wolves killing hunting dogs (Backeryd, 2007) .
In Scandinavia, there are four large carnivores: wolves, lynx, brown bears (Ursus arctos), and wolverines (Gulo gulo). Bears frequently prey upon moose calves (Rauset et al., 2012) but bear and wolverine depredation is mainly a topic of debate in northern parts of Scandinavia due to their predation on reindeer (Karlsson et al., 2016; Mattisson et al., 2016) . However, bears and wolverines are not resident within our study area, whereas Eurasian lynx and wolves are.
The lynx is a stalking predator that targets small-and medium-sized ungulates. The lynx select for roe deer when available (Odden et al., 2006; Andrén and Liberg, 2015) and do not seem to be very selective in terms of the age or sex of roe deer; instead, they seem to kill roe deer of any sex and age class even at very low prey density (Andersen et al., 2007; Molinari-Jobin et al., 2002; Okarma et al., 1997) . In south-central Sweden the mean lynx kill rate was approximately 58, 75, and 36 roe deer per year for males, females with kittens, and solitary females, respectively (Andrén and Liberg, 2015) . Lynx predation can have a strong influence on roe deer population growth, and thus the potential for harvest (Andrén and Liberg, 2015; Davis et al., 2016; Melis et al., 2009 ). However, the ultimate impact on roe deer populations varies depending on environmental conditions (Melis et al., 2009) and the extent of predation by other carnivores, such as red fox (Vulpes vulpes) (Kjellander and Nordström, 2003) . Lynx frequently prey upon fallow deer, but the information available in the scientific literature regarding lynx kill rates and selection of fallow deer remains limited. However, in Poland, it was well documented that lynx regularly kill the approximately 50% larger red deer (Jȩdrzejewski et al., 2000) even though the predation seems to be strongly skewed toward calves and females (Okarma, 1984) .
Wolves in Scandinavia target ungulates and can be a critical predator of most ungulate species (Sand et al., 2016) . Moose are major prey for wolves in many areas, and calves are generally selected (Wikenros et al., 2015) . Wolf predation of moose can have a considerable influence on the potential for the human harvest of moose (Wikenros et al., 2015) . In areas with roe deer, fallow deer, and red deer, these species can also be crucial prey for wolves (Jędrzejewski et al., 2002) . Wolves do prey upon wild boar but generally in a lower proportion than predictions based on their abundance (Jȩdrzejewski et al., 2000; Jędrzejewski et al., 2002) .
Hunting is a popular recreational activity in Sweden. There are approximately 300,000 hunters, and the annual gross hunting value is estimated to be approximately EUR 510 million (Mattson et al., 2008) . Hunting rights, including the rights to game meat and trophies, are related to land ownership. A landowner who does not want to hunt can lease out the right in whole or in part (Sandström et al., 2013) . Carnivore hunting is sometimes permitted to control carnivore populations. Opportunities for participation in brown bear hunting are advertised and sold to interested hunters, for example, through various internet fora, but there is no similar market for lynx and wolf license hunting.
Hunting leases are typically long term, either on an annual basis or for several years, but short-term leases on a daily or weekly basis are also available. Generally, a long-term lease implies that the landowner grants a team of hunters the right to hunt all species on the land. The hunting team consists of a couple of hunters who combine their resources to lease a hunting plot. For most species, the hunting team is free to decide on the harvesting strategy, as long as wildlife damages to agricultural and forest crops are held within reasonable limits. For moose, hunting is required by law to be coordinated across the so-called moose management areas to balance browsing damages and hunting benefits. Hunters, landowners, and county administration representatives then jointly decide on harvesting strategies (Sandström et al., 2013) .
Hunting teams and hunting leases are not officially registered, and lease contracts can be written or informal. An 1997 survey by the Ministry of Industry (1997) suggests that approximately half of the hunters obtain access to hunting plots through leases, 20% hunt on their own property, and 30% are invited by an individual who has the hunting right. Hunting teams are typically very stable over time (Ericsson et al., 2010) , and free places are usually filled by relatives and friends. Large forest companies can offer hunting leases to employees or apply waiting lists. Finding hunting land through adverts on the internet or in hunting journals is also possible.
Hunting lease revenues can be a critical source of income for landowners. Hunting occurs to some extent on most land where it is legally permitted (Sandström et al., 2013) . This area is, largely, all forest and agricultural land, which constitutes 69% and 8%, respectively, of the total land area in Sweden. Half of the forest land is owned by individuals, one third is owned by private companies, and the remainder is directly or indirectly owned by the government and other public institutions. > 90% of the agricultural land is owned by individuals, and the remainder is owned by companies, public institutions, and the government.
Conceptual model
Following the hedonic pricing literature, we assume that equilibrium rental prices for land are obtained through bargaining between landowner (s) and prospective user(s) of the land (Palmquist, 1989; Rosen, 1974) . In a perfectly competitive market, where hunters and landowners are price takers, equilibrium lease prices for hunting land are determined by the convergence between the bid and offer functions. The bid price is the maximum amount a hunter is willing to pay for the right to hunt on a given land, conditional on the land attributes; the offer price is the minimum amount a landowner is willing to accept to allow hunters to hunt on his or her land. Thus, the hunter's bid price is a function of his or her expected bag size of the prospective hunting ground, and other attributes of the land in question that could be valued by the hunter such as species composition, abundance of carnivores, and distance from the hunter's home. As a result, hunting grounds with favorable attributes will, other things being equal, attract a higher bid relative to hunting grounds with attributes less favorable for hunting. In the same manner, the offer price of the landowner is a function of land attributes because the landowner strives to extract the highest lease price possible given the availability of different attributes of the hunting ground.
In the following, we assume that the effect of carnivore populations on hunting lease prices can be decomposed into a direct and an indirect effect. We perform this decomposition to separate the impact of carnivores on lease price due to their impact on game abundance and, hence, harvest (the indirect effect) from other non-harvest effects that carnivores can have on hunters' willingness to pay for access to the hunting land (the direct effect). The indirect effect measures the impact of predation and the resultant negative impact on harvest values, given that a large carnivore abundance decreases the potential for sustainable harvest of game. The direct effect then captures the impact of carnivores on hunters' willingness to pay for hunting leases due to, for example, the increased risk for injuries and killing of hunting dogs, and the value that the hunter attaches to the presence of carnivores; the latter could be related to the hunters' preference for the existence of carnivores, or to the expectation for controlled license hunting. In principle, hunters could attach a positive or negative value to the presence of carnivores on their hunting ground depending on the relative strength of preferences for, for example, carnivores' impact on ecosystem well-being, the possibility of spotting carnivores, the likelihood of being able to participate in license hunting, and fear of attacks on hunting dogs.
Empirical model
To examine the effect of carnivore populations on hunting lease prices, we use the hedonic price approach. This approach allows us to estimate a hedonic price model for hunting leases and analyze the influence of predator populations on hunters' willingness to pay for hunting leases and, consequently, on the income of landowners from the sale of hunting leases. We follow an approach similar to earlier studies on hunting leases, such as Livengood (1983) (2017), by accounting for the impact of game abundance, location, and landscape characteristics of the hunting ground, and socioeconomic characteristics of the neighborhood. However, our paper differs from the literature by analyzing the effects of carnivore presence on hunters' valuation of hunting fields and by disentangling the effect of carnivores on hunting leases into the direct and indirect effects.
In our empirical model, we specify a system of Eqs.
(1-2) where Eq. (1) is a standard hedonic price function for hunting leases:
where P refers to the lease price paid by a hunting team. The variable H is a vector of game harvests, namely, the harvest of moose, fallow deer, roe deer, and wild boar, the four most harvested species in Sweden; C is a vector of carnivore populations, namely, lynx and wolves; D is a vector of land attributes. Further, M and Z represent, respectively, vectors of socioeconomic characteristics (e.g., income and rural-urban status) of the municipality and attributes of the hunting team, and α, β, γ, ρ, φ, and σ are parameters to be estimated. Additionally, we specify a game harvest equation as a function of game population size (X), hunting effort (E), carnivore population, and size of hunting ground (S), as expressed in Eq. (2):
where θ, δ, π, and τ are parameters to be estimated. We estimate Eqs.
(1) and (2) jointly to identify the total effect of carnivores on hunting lease prices given by the direct, γ, and indirect, π, effects. Regarding the respective covariates in Eq.
(1), we hypothesize that for species with positive hunting values, higher levels of harvest will be associated with a higher hunting lease price. We control for land attributes such as size of the hunting ground and distance of the hunting ground to the nearest big city. The literature has suggested that proximity of a hunting ground to large and urban centers is a good proxy for the cost of travel time and the associated opportunity cost of time for hunters in urban areas to access the plot (Little and Berrens, 2008; Lundhede et al., 2015; Mensah and Elofsson, 2017; Rhyne et al., 2009 ). If many prospective hunters live a long distance from a given hunting ground, this reduces the demand for the plot, and therefore reduces lease prices. If the hunting ground is located proximal to an urban center, there are large numbers of prospective bidders for the hunting lease, which could be expected to have a positive impact on the lease price. Additionally, because urban municipalities are typically more densely populated, hunting land could be scarce, which would further tend to increase the lease price of hunting land proximal to urban centers. 1 The size of the hunting ground can be a critical determinant of the hunting lease price (Mensah and Elofsson, 2017 ) because a larger plot implies a higher availability of game, ceteris paribus; increases the probability of a successful hunt at a given occasion; and could be positively related to the recreational value experienced by the hunter. Furthermore, average disposable income in the municipality within which a hunting ground is located may positively influence hunting lease prices.
In the harvest equation, Eq.
(2), we anticipate a positive effect of hunting effort, game population and size of hunting ground on game harvest. A negative effect of carnivore population on harvest is expected because carnivores prey on game, reducing game abundance and, hence, the probability of a successful hunt.
In estimating Eq.
(2), we use proxies for hunting effort and game populations because of the absence of actual data on these measures. For example, an appropriate measure of hunting effort would require data on the total number of hours or person days spent by each hunting team and availability of hunting equipment such as weapons, riflescopes, and hunting dogs. However, these data are not available, and we concluded that they could not be retrieved from a survey in a reliable manner because the respondents are not likely to be well informed about the time spent hunting, or the equipment used, by other hunting team members. To overcome this concern, we use the number of hunters in a hunting team as a proxy for hunting effort. Hunting is a time-intensive activity and a larger hunting group is likely to spend more hours on hunting in total, ceteris paribus.
For the game populations, an ideal circumstance would be to have data on the population size that would prevail in absence of carnivores to identify the relative role of carnivores and habitat factors for the game harvest. However, no such data are available, and no data on current populations are available. Regarding a proxy for the game population size in the absence of hunting and carnivores, we use an index of habitat quality, constructed for the purpose of this study, where we account for both the potential primary production of the landscape and the availability of shelter. 2 Both these factors must be accounted for because a landscape with high primary production can host larger populations of game (Pettorelli et al., 2009; Roseberry and Woolf, 1998) , and the provision of shelter is of importance to game because of speciesspecific adaptations (Tufto et al., 1996) . To compute this index, we use data on the standard yield of wheat, which is the main agricultural crop cultivated in the study area, and the share of the forest area in relation to the total hunting ground area. We use wheat yield in the index because agricultural crops offer a good source of supplementary wildlife food but in most cases, during only the vegetation season. Additionally, high wheat yield indicates overall high vegetation productivity of the land, which can be due to favorable soils and climate conditions. Higher productivity of the land implies that larger ungulate populations can be sustained. We use of the share of forest area in the index because forests provide both shelter and a critical source of winter food for most of the game population. Our habitat quality index is then increasing in the productivity of agricultural land and in the share of forest on the hunting ground. Hence, we expect that a higher index should be associated with a larger game population and, consequently, a larger harvest, ceteris paribus. The index is computed using the principal component analysis (PCA), and details are outlined in the data section.
Lynx can significantly affect the populations of roe and fallow deer but do not attack hunting dogs unprovoked; instead, such attacks are usually a consequence of the hunting dog chasing the lynx. Wolves, by contrast, prey on all game species and may attack (unprovoked) and kill hunting dogs; killings are more frequent than injuries. Additionally, individuals generally have stronger feelings about wolves (Ericsson et al., 2010) . Therefore, we expect a stronger direct negative impact of wolf on hunting lease price compared with lynx.
Identification strategy
In the estimation of Eqs. (1) and (2), some identification challenges are observed. First, the expression in Eq.
(2) suggests that harvest, H, is correlated with some of the explanatory variables (e.g., size of plot, carnivores) in Eq. (1), and thus correlated with the error term, that is, cov(H, ε) ≠ 0. This suggests that harvest is endogenous, further implying that the residuals of the two equations are likely to be correlated, cov(ε, μ) ≠ 0. Additionally, measurement errors are likely to occur, particularly regarding proxies for hunting effort and game population, and this results in a downward bias in the estimated parameters, a problem often referred to as attenuation bias (Wooldridge, 2010) .
The correlation between the residuals implies that the two equations are jointly determined; hence, estimating them separately will result in inconsistent estimates. We therefore estimate the equations jointly using the 3SLS. The 3SLS estimator uses an instrumental variable procedure to estimate the parameters of the system while accounting for the correlation between the residuals of the equations in the system (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993; Greene, 2012) . The approach estimates the system of equations using the generalized least square method. Further, by using the instrumental variable procedure, we reduce the bias induced by measurement errors.
Implicit prices
To estimate the economic cost of carnivore populations in terms of their impact on hunting, we compute the implicit price associated with carnivore populations from Eqs. (1) and (2). This corresponds to the partial derivative of the hedonic price function with respect to carnivores, as shown in Eq. (3):
where CC is the economic cost of a unit increase in carnivore abundance, ∂P/∂C ≥ ≤ 0 and (∂P/∂H)(∂H/∂C) ≤ 0 represent, respectively, the direct and indirect costs of carnivore abundance. The total value, dP/dC, is thus the sum of the direct and indirect costs. The direct cost measures the effect on hunting lease prices through increased risks for hunting dogs and through the recreational experience of the hunter, and the indirect cost measures the effects of carnivores on lease price through predation and its negative impact on harvests.
Data
The analysis in this paper includes data on hunting lease prices, deer harvest, hunting ground characteristics, and neighborhood socioeconomic characteristics over three hunting seasons: 2010/2011 to 2012/13. Data on hunting lease prices, land characteristics, land ownership, size of hunting team (number of hunters), and roe and fallow deer harvests were collected through telephone interviews with the chairs of local hunting associations, carried out in spring of 2013. The selection of respondents was based on the condition that both roe and fallow deer were present in the municipality because the dataset was collected to compare hunting values of the two species; this implies a limitation because the dataset then provides good coverage of the lynx residence area but limited coverage of the wolf residence area and no coverage of the brown bear residence area. Because we interviewed the representatives of local hunting associations, the resulting dataset includes only hunting leases for hunters that hunt in the vicinity of their home and have hunting lease contracts on annual basis, which happens to be the case for most hunting areas in Sweden. This simplifies the analysis because we do not have to account for segmentation of the hunting lease market with respect to the type of hunting experience provided, where there can be considerable differences between larger estate hunts and smaller hunting lands (Lundhede et al., 2015) . Further, obtaining the data from the local chairs implies that the respondents are well informed about both wildlife and the hunting lease market in the municipality. Hence, we expect that the price paid for the lease is adequate with respect to the plot-specific conditions and the conditions that prevail on the local lease market. We match our plot-level data with administrative data on moose and wild boar harvests from the national Wildlife Database (viltdata.se). The database contains information on harvests as reported on a voluntary basis by hunting teams. From the database, we extract the number of moose and wild boar shot per hectare in each year in the respective local hunting districts 3 that correspond to our hunting grounds. For ten of our locations, the moose harvest reports on the local hunting-district level were deemed to be of insufficient quality. To resolve this challenge, we used the county administrations' data for the moose management areas, the nearest higher spatial aggregation level, the where the coverage of moose harvests is complete. These moose and wild boar data were then used to calculate a proxy for the harvest at the respective hunting grounds. After data cleaning, data on 43 hunting teams in 43 different municipalities were considered relevant for the analysis, and the municipalities covered in the study are presented in Fig. 1 . Using data over all three hunting seasons (years), the total sample was 129 observations.
Data on lynx and wolf presence were obtained from the national monitoring program for carnivores 2010-2014, where the monitoring unit for wolves is family groups (i.e., a pair with offspring) and pairs (i.e., territorial [scent-marking] pairs), and for lynx, the unit is family groups 4 (i.e., one female with young of the year). Monitoring data are available from the Rovbase database (www.rovbase30. miljodirektoratet.no) and comprise coordinates for the center point of all observations documented within the monitoring program assumed to belong to the same family group or pair (Anon, 2014; Svensson et al., 2014) . We created a species-specific buffer zone around each center point corresponding to published home range sizes for wolves and lynx: 1000 km 2 for wolves (Mattson et al., 2008) and 320 km 2 for lynx (Aronsson et al., 2016) . 5 To obtain a relevant index reflecting lynx and wolf presence in each municipality, we calculated the area of all buffer zones for each species overlapping each municipality and divided with the area of the municipality. We allowed the buffer zones to overlap, to represent a more realistic abundance of the two carnivore species within each municipality, for example, a municipality of 10,000 km 2 , where one lynx buffer zone is completely within the boundaries of this municipality and another lynx buffer zone has half of its buffer within the boundaries of the municipality. Then, independently of whether the lynx buffers overlap or not, the lynx index equals (1.5×320)/ 10,000 = 0.048. The index for wolves ranged from 0 to 0.51, and for lynx, it ranged from 0 to 1.00.
Given the limited number of observations in our dataset, 129 in total, we aggregated game harvests based on predator-prey relationships. Different aggregations are used in the different estimations. Hence, we aggregated roe and fallow deer harvest into "deer harvest" because these two species are both important prey for lynx, and for wolves. In the same manner, moose and wild boar harvest were aggregated to "moose and boar harvest" because they both are prey for the wolf, but rarely for lynx. Finally, we also aggregate all harvests into one variable, "total game harvest." The first two harvest measures are used separately and jointly in the regressions. It is noteworthy to emphasize that in the regressions where we only included either "deer harvest" or "moose and boar harvest", the harvest measures should still be interpreted as alternative proxies for the game harvest, which differ by how they reflect the hunting harvest value on one hand, and the impact of carnivores on harvests on the other.
The distance to the nearest big city was calculated as the distance from the major urban center in the municipality to the nearest of the three largest Swedish cities: Stockholm, Gothenburg, and Malmö. Data on average disposable income for each municipality was obtained from Statistics Sweden, and the urban/rural classification was obtained from the Swedish Rural Development Agency (Glesbygdsverket, 2008) . The monetary variables, namely, lease price and income, are converted to real values in 2015 prices.
In search of a proxy for game population, we use PCA to compute a variable, which we refer to as "habitat index," using forestland share of the hunting ground, and the wheat production per hectare in the municipality. Results of the PCA are presented in Tables A1 and A2 in Appendix A. From the PCA, two components are created: the first component (Comp1) explains 51% of the variations in the original data, and the second component (Comp2) explains 49% of the variations. We, therefore, select the first component as our measure of "habitat index."
Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis are presented in Table 1 . Additionally, we show the correlation between game harvest, carnivore presence, and our measure of habitat index in Table  A3 in the appendix. The results show a relatively strong positive correlation among game species, with a correlation of 0.5 between deer harvest, and moose and wild boar harvest. Lynx harvest is also negatively (albeit weakly) correlated with deer harvest but positively correlated with moose and boar harvest-an indication that lynx prey largely on deer species. The correlation between wolf presence and the game species is, however, low, and the same holds for correlation between the two carnivore species. Finally, the habitat index is highly correlated with moose and boar harvest.
Results
The results of the 3SLS estimation of the system of Eqs. (8-9) are presented in Table 2 . We estimate several specifications. First, we separate the game harvest into deer (fallow and roe deer, in columns 1-2), moose and wild boar (columns 3-4), and a combination of these two groups (columns 5-7). A final estimation is performed using the total sum of the harvests of all four game species in columns (8) and (9) of Table 2 . For the purposes of this study, our specifications of interest are columns (8) and (9) to evaluate the effect of carnivore presence on hunting lease prices. This choice allows us to identify the total effect of carnivores on lease prices paid by hunting teams for the harvest of all species on the land. Additionally, comparatively, the models in columns (8) and (9) perform better, with a higher R-squared. The Breusch-Pagan LM test rejects the assumption of independences with a p value of 0.0000, indicating that the hedonic price function and the harvest functions are related, hence the importance of estimating them jointly.
In most of the specifications, we find a significant and positive effect of game harvest on hunting lease prices, suggesting that bag size of game species is a key determinant of hunters' willingness to pay for the right to hunt on a given land area. An exception is column (5), where we do not find any evidence of a significant association between game harvest and hunting lease prices.
We find a strong and positive impact of income on hunting lease prices in all cases except column (5), where the effect is insignificant, albeit positive. The positive and significant association suggests that hunting grounds within high-income municipalities attract high-equilibrium lease prices relative to hunting grounds in low-income municipalities. This effect is amplified by the positive effect on lease prices of having a hunting ground located in urban municipalities, albeit the effect is not statistically significant. The positive income effect can be attributed to demand-side factors: higher income drives up the demand for hunting land and hence equilibrium lease prices, an effect enhanced by the low supply of agricultural and forest lands in urban municipalities.
A common observation in the literature is the "distance-decay" effect in hunting lease pricing, implying that the value of a hunting ground decreases with the geographic distance between the plot and urban centers (Little and Berrens, 2008; Livengood, 1983) . Little and Berrens (2008) for instance, in a study of payment for hunting permits in the Southwestern United States observe a strong and negative effect of distance between a hunting location and the nearest developed urban area, with an implicit cost of US$3.4 per mile 6 (US$ 2.1 per km). However, we do not find consistent evidence from the results to support this claim because our estimates are significant in only one instance (column 3). 5 This method has limitations because it is unknown how well the assumed center points from the observations during the monitoring represent the actual location of home ranges. Further, the species-specific buffer zones around these are assumed to be circular and, hence, do not consider the natural variation in home range shape and size. Despite these limitations, we argue that our index it is the best possible available for this study. 6 1.61 km
We also observe mixed evidence on the relationship between the size of the hunting ground and the total lease price paid by a representative hunting team for a given harvest. In columns (1) and (8), we find a positive and significant relationship; however, the relationship is insignificant in columns (3) and (5). As a result, we are unable to offer consistent evidence on the possible influence of the size of hunting ground on equilibrium hunting lease prices. Further, we find no evidence on the effect of urbanization on lease prices, suggesting that hunting lease prices in urban localities are statistically not different from lease prices of rural hunting grounds, given that distance from large cities is controlled for.
The effects of our habitat index on game harvest also show mixed results. We observe a negative relationship between the habitat index and deer harvest in one of the estimations (column 2), but a positive relationship between the habitat index and the harvest of moose and wild boar in another estimation (column 7). The first result is contrary to our à priori expectations. A possible explanation is that deer populations are subject to a higher hunting effort in areas with higher agricultural productivity. Existing regulations stipulate that browsing damages on agricultural crops in Sweden should be managed through hunting. A landowner who considers the damages to be too large would typically ask the hunters that lease the hunting rights on his land to hunt more in order to reduce the population and spare crop damages. The unexpected sign could thus reflect differences between regions with higher and lower agricultural productivity with respect to the effort to protect agricultural crops from browsing damages. For the moose and boar harvest, the habitat index is positive and significant, as was expected à priori, that is, a large abundance of food and shelter for the game is associated with a larger harvest.
Regarding the carnivore effect, our results show significant and negative effects of lynx on deer harvest and on total game harvest. The effect of lynx abundance on moose and wild boar harvest is also negative but insignificant, as we expected, given that lynx mainly prey on roe and fallow deer and rarely prey on larger game species such as moose and wild boar. There is no significant direct effect of lynx presence on lease prices.
Notably, the direct effect of wolf presence on lease price is negative in all cases even though it is significant only in the estimation including only moose and boar harvest. A possible reason underlying the nonsignificance of the wolves' impact in most of the estimates is that wolves are sparsely distributed in the study area and mainly populate its northern parts where fallow deer are rare. Further, our results do not offer conclusive evidence on the relationship between number of hunters in a team and game harvest.
Marginal implicit values
As shown, we found no significant evidence of the impact of wolves on game harvest and lease prices. In the following, we therefore focus on estimating the economic cost of lynx.
As highlighted in Eq. (3), our system of equations allows us to estimate the direct, ∂P/∂C, and indirect impact, ∂P/∂H × ∂H/∂C, respectively, of carnivore populations. However, our results do not suggest any direct impact of lynx on lease prices, because the coefficient of the lynx area is not significant in any of the lease price equations. This finding implies that the impact of lynx on hunting lease prices occurs only through its impact on reducing game harvest.
We estimate the indirect impact of lynx on lease prices by using the (8) and (9), where the equation on total game harvest is used. The use of these equations are preferred to the other equations because the lease grants the right to hunt all game species, and because the estimations in columns (5-7) do not provide significant estimates, which can be attributed to the complexity of that model in relation to the number of observations in the dataset. To calculate the marginal cost of one additional lynx family, we investigate how an increase in the lynx index, corresponding to the buffer (i.e., home range) size of one lynx family, affects the hunting lease price. We use our point estimate for the lynx index in column (9) and the point estimate for total game harvest in column (8) to calculate the resulting impact on hunting lease price. Using column (9), we find that on average, an additional lynx buffer reduces harvests by 17%, corresponding to 4.5 animals per hunting ground and 301.5 animals per municipality. Using this effect together with the point estimate for total game harvest in column (8), we find that an additional lynx family would impose a significant cost, corresponding to on average SEK 22,608 (EUR 2428) per hunting ground and year, equivalent to 15.7% of the hunting lease value (Table 3 ).
Our regressions provide information about the impact of increased lynx abundance in the municipality on hunting lease price for an average hunting ground in that municipality, independently of whether the lynx buffer actually overlaps this hunting ground. To find the total effect of an additional lynx buffer we, therefore, had to sum up the decline in lease price over all hunting grounds in the municipality. Noting that the average hunting ground in southern Sweden is 11.05 km 2 (Table 1 ) and taking into account that the land available for hunting (i.e., forest and agricultural land) is 86% of total land in our study area, there are on average 67 hunting grounds per municipality in our dataset. Multiplying the cost per hunting ground by the average number of hunting grounds in the municipality then provides the total cost of an additional lynx buffer: SEK 1.51 million (EUR 0.162 million) per year.
Because our estimates are associated with some uncertainty, and because we do not want to overestimate the cost of additional lynx, we also calculate a lower bound for the cost of an additional lynx family by using a one-sided 95% confidence interval. This exercise shows that with 95% certainty, the reduction in the average lease price is larger than SEK 5081 (EUR 546) per hunting ground and year, and larger than SEK 340, 427 (EUR 36, 561) per lynx family and per year. Details on the cost calculations are provided in Appendix B.
Discussion and conclusions
This study presents an empirical analysis of the direct and indirect effects of carnivores on hunting values in Sweden using the hedonic price method. The paper accounts for possible endogeneity between game harvest and carnivore presence by estimating a system of equations using the 3SLS and applying it to three-year panel data on hunting lease prices and game harvest from a sample of hunting teams in Sweden.
Results from the paper show that income, harvest rates, and the size of the hunting ground exert significant direct impacts on the determination of equilibrium prices. On the impact of carnivores, we do not find any evidence of a direct impact of lynx on hunting lease prices. The effect occurs only through predation on game species preferred by hunters, namely, an indirect impact. Specifically, we find that lynx presence exerts a significantly negative impact on the number of harvested game, particularly deer species. The lynx thus compete with hunters for game, reducing the potential bag sizes for the respective hunting team. The effects of wolves on bag size is also negative but insignificant, which may be explained by the relatively recent and limited occurrence of wolves in the study area and, hence, in the dataset, compared with lynx. Hence, we find no clear evidence of either a direct or an indirect impact of wolves in the determination of hunting lease prices in the study area.
We further estimate the marginal implicit cost associated with lynx presence, and results suggest that in an average municipality, the addition of one more lynx family group (and associated unmonitored individuals) would lead to a loss of 15.7% of the hunting lease value, equivalent to SEK 22,608 (EUR 2428) per hunting ground and year and SEK 1.51 million (EUR 0.162 million) per year at the municipality level. This result could be compared with the estimates of deer hunting values: Mattson et al. (2008) estimate that the gross hunting value of roe deer was approximately SEK 635 million (EUR 68 million in hunting season 2005/6, and in the same year, the total roe deer harvest was 129,000 (www.viltdata.se). A harvest loss of 301.5 animals, such as estimated in this paper to be the average yearly loss associated with another lynx buffer, would then imply a loss of hunting value equal to approximately SEK 1.48 million (EUR 0.159 million) per year, which is close to our estimate, suggesting that our results are reasonable. Further, our estimated cost could be compared with earlier studies on the costs of lynx due to depredation on livestock. For example, Bostedt and Grahn (2008) estimate that the marginal cost of an additional lynx, in terms of the depredation on domestic livestock and reindeer, is approximately EUR 1700 in year 2015 value, and Widman and Elofsson (2018) show that the marginal cost of lynx, in terms of the depredation on sheep, varies between 1 and 82 EUR across Swedish counties. Here, a comparison with Bostedt and Grahn (2008) seems more relevant because of their inclusion of all livestock in their estimates. Then, because a lynx family typically consists of approximately six individuals (Andrén et al., 2002) , a comparison between our results and those in Bostedt and Grahn (2008) suggests that the economic impact on hunting lease value is close to 16 times as large as the cost in terms of livestock depredation. Evidently, this finding should be interpreted with care because the cost estimate in Bostedt and Grahn (2008) accounts for only depredation costs compensated by the government, implying that effects related to stressed livestock, reduced productivity, and increased labor are not fully accounted for (cf., e.g., Nyhus et al., 2003) .
Ideally, the marginal cost of an additional lynx family group should be compared with the associated marginal benefit. However, studies that have attempted to estimate the value of large carnivores in terms of an individual's willingness to pay for preservation do not provide marginal benefits but rather the willingness to pay for preserving a given total population (Broberg and Brännlund, 2008; Ericsson et al., 2008) . In addition, according to our review of the literature, no study has attempted to estimate the willingness to pay for preservation of the lynx specifically, but studies have either focused on wolves or treated all large carnivores as an aggregate (Broberg and Brännlund, 2008) . Hence, there are no relevant, comparable benefit estimates.
The limited size of the dataset makes it necessary to consider the potential for transferring results to other locations within and outside the studied area. Our data are observations provided by the chairs of the local hunting associations. These chairs could potentially have Table 3 Cost of one additional lynx family group in terms of its impact on hunting lease prices. somewhat more productive hunting grounds, because they could be better informed and have stronger social networks among hunters and landowners than the average hunter. Furthermore, the impact of carnivores on game harvests and lease prices could potentially differ between more and less productive hunting grounds. For example, Melis et al. (2009) show that the impact of lynx on roe deer density is higher at locations with low vegetation productivity. Together, these findings suggest that our estimates on lynx impacts could potentially be somewhat lower than for other hunting grounds within the study area and for locations in north Sweden where vegetation productivity is lower than in south Sweden. We must emphasize that our aforementioned analysis is not without weaknesses. First, the absence of precise data on game populations and hunting efforts may induce measurement errors. Although the proxies used for these variables are justifiable and reduce the extent of measurement errors, they do not entirely overcome the problem. Extended systematic collection of relevant statistics regarding hunting leases and hunting teams would relieve this problem. Additionally, our regression model explicitly ignores the presence of spatial spillovers in the lease pricing. Additionally, evidence from Mensah and Elofsson (2017) indicate that lease prices in Sweden exhibit significant spatial correlation and ignoring them may result in an underestimation of harvest values. This tends to strengthen the conclusion that our lynx cost estimates should be considered prudent and implies that costs are very unlikely to be less than our lower bound estimate.
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Appendix A

Variable Comp1 Comp2
Agric productivity −0.7071 0.7071 Forest share 0.7071 0.7071 Table A3 Correlation matrix for game species, carnivore presence, and habitat index. 
Appendix B. Calculation of the implicit cost of lynx
We calculate the implicit cost of lynx using Eq. (3). As the direct effect of lynx is insignificant, we set the first term to zero: = + = + 0 dP dC P C P H H C P H H C . We want to estimate the implicit cost of lynx for a relevant unit and the home range (buffer) of one lynx family, which is 320 km 2 . Based on data from Statistics Sweden, the average area of the municipalities in our dataset is 863 km 2 . An increase in the lynx index, corresponding to one additional lynx buffer, is then 320/863 = 0.37 units.
In Eq. (2), the harvest variable is logged. Hence, using the estimated coefficient for the lynx index from Table 2 , column (9), for a one unit change in the index, the reduction in harvest is 100 • (1 − e −0.625 ) = 46%. For the change corresponding to one lynx buffer, the impact on harvest is then 46 • 0.37 = 17.02 % . Using the average game harvest from Table 1 , which is 26.57 animals, one additional lynx buffer then reduces game harvests by 4.5 animals. A 95% one-sided lower bound on the harvest impact is calculated using the standard error for the estimated coefficient: π + t 0.95 • SE π = − 0.625 + 1.64 • 0.283 = − 0.161; for a unit change in the lynx index, this implies a 14.87% reduction in the harvest, and a change corresponding to one lynx buffer implies a 5.50% reduction. In absolute numbers, that corresponds to a reduction in harvest of 1.5 animals for an average hunting ground.
Again, from the results in Table 2 , column (8), a decrease in game harvest by 1% results in a 0.92% decrease in hunting lease price with a lower bound estimate of 0.64%. Hence, a 17.02% reduction of the harvest implies a 15.66% reduction in the lease price. Using the two lower bound estimates, we obtain instead a reduction by 3.52%. Thus, based on sample average lease prices in Table 1 (SEK 144,370 per year), the average reduction in the lease price equals SEK 22,608 per year, with a lower bound estimate of SEK 5081 per year.
With our setup, an additional lynx buffer affects the lease price for a hunting plot in a municipality independently of whether the buffer overlaps the hunting plot or not. Hence, to obtain the total cost for an additional lynx buffer, we need to sum over all hunting grounds in the municipality. Data from the Statistics Sweden database (www.scb.se) show that the share of forest and agricultural lands is 86% in the municipalities where the hunting grounds in our study are located. We take this percentage to be the share of an average municipality available for hunting. Using this figure together with average municipality area, and the size of the average hunting ground (Table 1) , each municipality has on average 67 hunting grounds. To obtain the total impact on harvests and on hunting lease prices paid, we multiply harvest and lease price effects at the hunting ground level by the average number of hunting grounds in a municipality. The total reduction in game harvest in an average municipality is then 301.5, with a lower bound of 100.5, and the associated total reduction in lease prices is SEK 1,514,736 per year, with a lower bound of SEK 340,427 per year. 
